We study experimental design in large-scale stochastic systems with substantial uncertainty and structured cross-unit interference. We consider the problem of a platform that seeks to optimize supply-side payments p in a centralized marketplace where different suppliers interact via their effects on the overall supply-demand equilibrium, and propose a class of local experimentation schemes that can be used to optimize these payments without perturbing the overall market equilibrium. We show that, as the system size grows, our scheme can estimate the gradient of the platform's utility with respect to p while perturbing the overall market equilibrium by only a vanishingly small amount. We can then use these gradient estimates to optimize p via any stochastic first-order optimization method. These results stem from the insight that, while the system involves a large number of interacting units, any interference can only be channeled through a small number of key statistics, and this structure allows us to accurately predict feedback effects that arise from global system changes using only information collected while remaining in equilibrium.
Introduction
Randomized controlled trials are widely used to guide decision making across several areas, ranging from classical industrial and agricultural settings [Fisher, 1935] to the modern tech sector [Athey and Luca, 2019 , Kohavi et al., 2009 , Tang et al., 2010 . A growing interest in randomized experiments, or A/B tests, has even led to the creation of specialized companies that help with rigorous statistical inference in dynamic designs [Johari et al., 2017] .
Much of the existing work on experimental design has focused on settings where we can intervene separately on different units, i.e., there is no cross-unit interference, and this lack of interference plays a key role in justifying standard analyses of randomized trials [Imbens and Rubin, 2015] . This interference-free assumption, however, is violated in many important applications. For example, Bottou et al. [2013] describe difficulties in using randomized experiments to study internet ad auctions: Advertisers participate in an auction to determine ad placements, and any intervention on one advertiser may change their
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behavior on the auction and thus affect the opportunities available to other advertisers. In a different context, Blake and Coey [2014] document failures of the no-interference assumption due to an interaction between treated and control customers in an experiment run by an online marketplace.
The question of how to run experiments when simple A/B tests fail has proven to be challenging. Approaches have been proposed that assume sparse interference patterns. For example, when studying Internet ad auctions, Basse et al. [2016] , Kohavi et al. [2009] and Ostrovsky and Schwarz [2011] note that the auction type used for one ad keyword does not meaningfully affect how advertisers bid for other keywords, and then consider experiments that randomly assign keywords, rather than advertisers, to different conditions. Similarly, a social network might try to deploy different versions of a feature in different countries, and hope that the number of cross-border links is small enough to induce only negligible interference. The limitation of these approaches, however, is that the power of any experiment is limited by the number of non-interfering clusters available: For example, if a platform has 200 million customers in 100 countries, but chooses to randomize by country, then the largest effective sample size they can use for any experiment is 100, and not 200 million.
In this paper, we propose an alternative approach to experimentation in stochastic systems, where a large number of, if not all, units interfere with one another. For concreteness, we focus on the problem of setting supply side payments in a centralized marketplace, where available demand is randomly allocated to a set of available suppliers. In these systems, different suppliers interact via their effects on the overall supply-demand equilibrium: the more suppliers choose to participate in the marketplace, the less demand on average an individual supplier would be able to serve in equilibrium. The objective of the system designer is to identify the optimal payment that maximizes the platform's utility. Note that conventional randomized experimentation schemes that assume no interference fail in this system: For example, if we double the per-transaction payments made to a random half of suppliers, these suppliers will increase their production levels and reduce the amount of demand available to the remaining suppliers, and thus reduce their incentives to produce.
We consider a simple model of such a centralized marketplace, and design a class of "local" experimentation schemes that-by carefully leveraging the structure of the marketplaceenable us to optimize payments without perturbing the overall market equilibrium. More specifically, we perturb the per-transaction payment p i available to the i-th supplier by a small mean-zero shock, i.e., p i " p`ζε i where 0 ă ζ ! 1 and ε i "˘1 independently and uniformly at random. Then, in the limit where the number of suppliers is large, we show that we can estimate the gradient of the platform's utility with respect to p while perturbing the overall market equilibrium by only a vanishingly small amount. We can then use these gradient estimates to optimize p via any stochastic first-order optimization method, such as stochastic gradient descent and its extensions.
The driving insight behind our result is that, although there is dependence across the behavior of a large number of units in the system, any such interference can only be channeled through a small number of key statistics: in our example, the total supply made available by all suppliers. Then, if we can intervene on individual units without meaningfully affecting the key statistics, we can obtain meaningful information about the system at a cost that scales sub-linearly in the number of units.
Related Work
The problem of experimental design under interference has received considerable attention in the statistics literature. The dominant paradigm has focused on robustness to interference, and on defining estimands in settings where some units may be exposed to spillovers from treating other units [Aronow and Samii, 2017 , Athey et al., 2018 , Basse et al., 2019 , Eckles et al., 2017 , Hudgens and Halloran, 2008 , Manski, 2013 , Sobel, 2006 . Depending on applications, the exposure patterns may be simple (e.g., the units are clustered such that exposure effects are contained within clusters) or more complicated (e.g., the units are connected in a network, and two units far from each other in graph distance are not exposed to each others' treatments). Unlike this line of work that seeks robustness to interference driven by potentially complex and unknown mechanisms, the local randomization scheme proposed here crucially relies on having a stochastic model that lets us explain interference. Then, because all inference acts via a simple statistic, we can move beyond simply seeking robustness to interference and can in fact accurately predict interference effect using information gathered in equilibrium.
The idea that one can distill insights of a structural model down to the relationship between a small number of observable statistics has a long tradition in economics [Chetty, 2009] , and can often be used for practical counterfactual analysis without needing to fit complicated structural models. Here, we use such an argument for experimental design rather than to guide methods for observational study analysis.
Our approach to optimizing p using gradients obtained from local experimentation intersects with the literature on noisy zeroth-order optimization [e.g., Spall, 2005] , which aims to optimize a function f pxq by sequentially evaluating f at points x 1 , x 2 , . . ., and obtaining in return noisy versions of the function values f px 1 q, f px 2 q, . . . A number of zeroth-order optimization methods first generate noisy gradient estimates of the function by comparing adjacent function values, and subsequently use these estimates in a first-order optimization method [Jamieson et al., 2012 , Duchi et al., 2012 , Ghadimi and Lan, 2013 , Nesterov and Spokoiny, 2017 ]. In our model, this approach would amount to estimating utility gradients via global experimentation, by comparing the empirical utilities observed at two different payment levels. Compared to this literature, our paper exploits a cross-sectional structure not present in most existing zeroth-order models: We show that our local experimentation approach, which offers slightly different payments across a large number of units, is far more efficient at estimating the gradient than global experimentation, which offers all units the same payment on a given day. Notably, local experimentation is beneficial even if the final objective is to identify a single optimal payment for all units. Such cross-sectional signals would be lost if we abstracted away the multiplicity of units, and only treated the average payment as a decision variable to be optimized.
The limiting regime that we use, one in which the system size tends to infinity, is often known as the mean-field limit. It has a long history in the study of large-scale stochastic systems, such as those arising in queueing networks [Halfin and Whitt, 1981 , Vvedenskaya et al., 1996 , Bramson et al., 2012 , Tsitsiklis and Xu, 2012 and interacting particle systems [Mézard et al., 1987 , Sznitman, 1991 , Graham and Méléard, 1994 . Likewise, our proposed method leverages a key property of the mean-field limit: While changes to the behavior of a single unit may have significant impact on other units in a finite system, such interference diminishes as the system size grows and, in the limit, the behaviors among any finite set of units become asymptotically independent from one another, a phenomenon known as the propagation of chaos [Sznitman, 1991 , Graham and Méléard, 1994 , Bramson et al., 2012 . This asymptotic independence property underpins the effectiveness of our local experimentation scheme, and ensures that small, symmetric payment perturbations do not drastically alter the equilibrium demand-supply dynamics. Our work thus suggests that, just as meanfield models have been successful in the analysis of stochastic systems, they may be a useful paradigm for designing experiments in large stochastic systems.
Local Experimentation in Stochastic Systems
For concreteness, we focus our discussion on a simple setting inspired by a centralized marketplace for freelance labor that operates over a number of periods. In each period, the high-level objective of the decision maker (i.e., operator of the platform) is to match demand with a pool of potential suppliers in such a manner that maximizes the platform's expected utility. To do so, the decision maker offers payments to each potential supplier individually, who in turn decides whether to become active/available based upon their belief of future revenue. Our main question is how the decision maker can use experimentation efficiently to discover their revenue-maximizing payment, despite not knowing the detailed parameterization of the model, and the presence of substantial stochastic uncertainty.
We formally describe a flexible stochastic model in Section 3. For now, however, it is helpful to consider an elementary variant of our model that, despite its simplicity, lets us highlight some key properties of our approach. Each day k " 1, ..., K there are i " 1, ..., n potential suppliers, and demand for D k identical tasks to be accomplished. A central platform offers a payment p ik to each supplier that they can earn by servicing a unit of demand. The suppliers can accurately anticipate demand D k (e.g., via their knowledge of local weather or events); however, the platform may not be able to. Given their knowledge of p ik and D k , each supplier independently chooses to become "active"; we write Z ik " 1 for active suppliers and Z ik " 0 else. Then, demand D k is randomly allocated to active suppliers (where each active supplier can service at most one unit of demand).
Our key assumption is that each supplier chooses to become active based on their expected revenue conditionally on being active: They first compute q D k pp .k q, the probability that they will be matched with a unit of demand conditionally on being active (which also depends on the payments offered to other supplies), and then take expected revenue to be p ik q D k pp .k q. For now, we assume the following simple functional form
where B i measures the value of a random supplier-specific outside option; as discussed in Section 3, this specific functional form does not matter for our results-the important point is suppliers only interact via q D ppq. Finally, assume that the utility of the platform is as follows (later, we will relax the functional form of R),
where T " ř n i"1 Z i is the total number of active suppliers,p is the average payment made to suppliers who service a unit of demand, and C is a scaling constant. Figure 1 shows a simple example of an equilibrium resulting from this model in the limit as n gets large in a setting where all suppliers are offered the same price p, for a specific realization of demand D; here D " 0.3n, C " 100, and logpB i {20q has a standard Here µ D ppq represents the probability that a random supplier decides to become active at p, whereas q D ppq is the expected faction of active suppliers who will be matched with a unit of demand.
Gaussian distribution. Overall, we see that the expected fraction of active suppliers
T {nˇˇD ‰ increases with p, whereas q D ppq decreases in p. There is a noticeable kink in the slope of µ D once q D falls below 1 due to equilibrium effects.
In order to optimize payments p, the platform needs to understand the expected utility function χppq " E p rU {ns well enough to find its maximum. Before presenting our proposal, we briefly outline two baselines that are often discussed in practice.
• Global experimentation: On each day k " 1, ..., K, we randomly choose a payment p k that is made available to all suppliers. We then observe utility U k , which acts as a noisy estimate of χpp k q. Given sufficient time periods, this approach will consistently find the maximizer p˚of χp¨q; however, the cost of experimentation is substantial, as we may end up repeatedly offering poorly chosen payments p k to all suppliers in the marketplace.
• Classical A/B experimentation: On each day k " 1, ..., K, we choose a small random fraction of suppliers and offer them a payment p k , while everyone else gets offered the status quo payment p 0 . We could then try to use the behavior of suppliers offered p k to estimate χpp k q. This approach allows for cheap experimentation because most of the suppliers get offered p 0 . However, it will not consistently recover the optimal payment p˚because it ignores feedback effects: When we raise payments, more suppliers opt to join the market and so the probability of any given supplier being matched with demand goes down-and this attenuates the payment-sensitivity of supply relative to what is predicted by A/B testing.
Our goal is to use high-level information about the stochastic system described above to design a new experimental framework that lets us avoid the problems of both approaches described above: We want our experimental scheme to be consistent for p˚like global experimentation, but also to be cost-effective (like classical A/B testing) in that it only requires small perturbations to the status quo.
Estimating Utility Gradients in Equilibrium
The driving insight behind our approach is that it is possible to learn about χppq via unobstrusive randomization by randomly perturbing the prices p ik offered to supplier i in time period k: We propose setting
uniformly at random, where ζ ą 0 is a (small) constant that governs the magnitude of the perturbations. Then, by regressing market participation Z ik on the price perturbations ε ik , we can estimate the average local payment sensitivity of suppliers ignoring feedback effects [Imbens and Angrist, 1994] ∆ D ppq "
This quantity ∆ is not directly of interest for optimizing p, as it ignores feedback effects. However, it turns out that ∆ captures relevant information for optimizing p and, given our generic model structure, we find that as the system size n grows
where all terms in (2.5) other than ∆ and the actual average sensitivity dµ D ppq{dp (which accounts for feedback) are readily observable from the data. The upshot is that, once we can estimate ∆ via local randomization (2.3), we can also get estimates of dµ D ppq{dp by solving (2.5), and finally obtain noisy p Γ gradients for dχppq{dp. A formal statement is given in Theorem 2.
We can thus use unobstrusive randomization as in (2.3) to estimate the gradient dχppq{dp around any chosen price p. The final step of our proposed approach, local experimentation, is to use these gradients to guide any first-order optimization method. For example, one could use gradient descent and, at each time period k estimate dχpp k q{dp k as p Γ k , and then set
In our experiments, we use variant of stochastic gradient descent called adagrad [Duchi et al., 2011] ; in principle, one could also use more sophisticated methods that rely on acceleration [Cohen et al., 2018] . Figure 2 shows results on a simple simulation experiment in the setting of Figure 1 , where the scaled demand D{n follows a betap15, 35q distribution. We initialize the system at p 1 " 30, and then each day run price perturbations as in (2.3) to guide a price update using adagrad. We see that the system quickly converges to a near-optimal price of around 17.
We also compare our results to what one could obtain using the baseline of global experimentation, where we randomize the price p k " Uniformp10, 30q in each time step and measure resulting utility U k , and then choose the final paymentp by maximizing a smooth estimate of the expectation of U k given p k . The left panel of Figure 3 shows the resulting pp k , U k q pairs, as well as the resultingp. As seen in the right panel of Figure 2 , the finalp obtained via this method is a reasonable estimate of the optimal p. However, the price of experimentation incurred for finding thisp is huge: As shown in the right panel of Figure 3 , after the first few days, the global experimentation approach systematically achieves lower daily utilities U k than local experimentation because it often uses very poor choices of p k . In principle, it may be possible to design a smarter version of global experimentation than the random search pursued above; for example, it may be possible to leverage recent advances in Bayesian optimization to rule out poor choices of p early on [Letham et al., 2018] . However, designing a variant of global experimentation that is competitive with our approach when n is large appears to be a challenging task. For example, any direct alternative to our method that seeks to estimate the gradient dχppq{dp via global experimentation would need to undertake perturbations that scales linearly in n in order to get any finite error bounds (or, equivalently, the average per-supplier perturbation would need to be of constant order as n gets large). In contrast, local experimentation allows for per-supplier perturbations that scale only a little slower than 1{ ? n. Thus, any approach to global experimentation that seeks to estimate dχppq{dp will require unboundedly larger perturbations than our approach as the number of suppliers n gets large.
Model: Stochastic Market with Centralized Pricing
We now present the general stochastic model we use to motivate our approach. All random variables are assumed to be independent across the periods and, within each period, are independent from one another unless otherwise stated. We will consider a sequence of systems, indexed by n P N, where in the nth system there are n potential suppliers. We will refer to n as the market size. All variables in our model are thus implicitly dependent on the index, n. We largely suppress this notation when the context is clear. When appropriate, we may make such dependence explicitly using the superscript pnq, e.g., q pnq .
Demand To reflect the reality that demand fluctuations may not concentrate with n, we allow for a random stochastic global state A drawn from a finite set A. The global state affects demand, and is known to market participants (suppliers), but not to the platform (or that the platform cannot react to). For example, in a ride sharing example, A could capture the effect of weather (rain / shine) or major events (conference, sports game, etc.). Conditionally on the global state A " a, we assume that demand, D, is drawn from distribution D " F a . We further assume that the demand scales proportionally with respect to the market size n, and that it concentrates after re-scaling by 1{n. In particular, we assume that there exists td a u aPA Ă R`, such that for all a P A:
and that E rD|A " as " d a for all n P N. It is assumed that each supplier can serve up to one unit of demand. In general, we will use the sub-script a to denote the conditioning that the global state A " a.
Matching Demand with Suppliers Depending on the realization of demand, all or a subset of the suppliers will be selected to serve the demand. In particular, the matching between the potential suppliers and demand occurs in two rounds:
Round 1: Suppliers choose whether to they want to be active. A payment p i is announced to supplier i, for i " 1, 2, . . . , n, with the understanding that the supplier will be compensated with p i if eventually matched with demand. A supplier will not be matched if they choose to be inactive. We write Z i P t0, 1u to denote whether the i-th participant chooses to participate in the marketplace, and write T " ř n i"1 Z i as the total number of active suppliers. The mechanism through which a supplier determines whether or not to become active will be described shortly. Round 2: The platform selects a subset of the active suppliers to satisfy the demand. If supplier i is selected, they will be paid p i and tasked with serving one unit of demand; otherwise, the supplier will not be paid, and no demand will be served in that scenario. The selection procedure is randomized: if D ě T , then all active suppliers are selected. Otherwise, a subset of D active suppliers will be selected uniformly at random.
Supplier Choice Behavior We assume that each supplier takes into account their expected revenue in equilibrium when making the decision of whether or not to become active. In particular, denote by q a ppq fi E " pD{T q^1ˇˇA " a ‰ (3.2) a supplier's belief of their chance of being matched with a unit of demand should they choose to become active, conditionally on the global state being a. Here, the expectation is calculated with respect to the equilibrium distribution of the number of active suppliers, T . (For now, assume that such equilibrium distribution is well defined, and we will justify its meaning rigorously in a moment.) Then, the probability of supplier i becoming active is given by µ a ppq fi PpZ i " 1ˇˇA " aq " E rf Bi pp i q a ppqqs ,
Here, p i q a ppq is their expected revenue in equilibrium. B i is a private feature that captures the heterogeneity across potential suppliers, such as a supplier's cost, or noise in their estimate of the expected revenue. We assume that the B i 's are drawn i.i.d. from a set B conditionally on A. f b p¨q is a choice function, and f b pxq represents the probability of the supplier becoming active, when their private feature is b and expected equilibrium revenue is x. We assume the family of choice functions tf b p¨qu bPB satisfies the following assumption.
Assumption 1. For all b P B, the choice function f b p¨q takes values in r0, 1s, is monotonically non-decreasing, and twice differentiable with a uniformly bounded second derivative.
Below is one example of a family of choice functions that satisfies Assumption 1:
Example 1 (Logistic Choice Function). A popular model in choice theory is the logit model (cf. Chapter 3 of Train [2009] ), which, in our context, corresponds to the choice function being the logistic function: f b pxq " 1 1`e´α px´bq , where α ą 0 is a parameter. Furthermore, let the private feature B i take values in R`and represent the break-even cost threshold of supplier i. In this example, the supplier's decision on whether to activate will depend on whether their expected revenue exceeds their break-even cost. The sensitivity of such dependence is modeled by the parameter α. Note that in the limit as α Ñ 8, the probability of Z i " 1 is either 0 or 1. That is, a supplier will choose to be active if and only if they believe their expected revenue from Round 2 will exceed the break-even threshold B i .
Platform Utility and Objective Let S i be the indicator variable that the i-th potential supplier was selected to serve a unit of demand. The platform's utility is defined to be the difference between revenue and total payment:
where W " ř n i"1 pZ i^Si q p i L ř n i"1 pZ i^Si q is the average payment across all selected suppliers. RpT, Dq is the platform's revenue, with equilibrium active supply size is T and total demand D. We assume that the revenue function R is linear, in the sense that RpαT, αDq " αRpT, Dq, α P R`.
(3.5)
As an example, the platform could receive a fixed amount γ from each unit of demand served, in which case we have RpT, Dq " γpT^Dq. The revenue function (2.2) used in our motivating example also satisfies (3.5), but tapers off as D gets very close to T to reflect potential congestion effects. Given this notation, we write the platform's expected utility in the nth system as
The objective of the decision maker (i.e., platform operator) is to set the payment p so as to maximize χppq.
Unit-Level Price Perturbation An important instrument that will be used repeatedly throughout the paper is the unit-level payment perturbation. Let tε i u iPN be a sequence of i.i.d. Bernoulli random variables with Ppε i "´1q " Ppε i "`1q " 1 2 . Fix p ą ζ ą 0. We say the payments are ζ-perturbed from p,
In what follows, we will use q a pp, ζq to denote the value of q a ppq when the payments are ζ-perturbed from p. The meanings of µ a pp, ζq, χ pnq a pp, ζq, χ pnq pp, ζq are to be understood analogously. We may omit the dependence on ζ, when ζ " 0.
Existence and Uniqueness of Equilibrium Active Supply Size
The model described above assumes the existence and uniqueness of an equilibrium active supply size, T . We now provide a formal definition:
Definition 2 (Active Supply Size in Equilibrium). We say that a random variable T is an equilibrium supply size, if, when all suppliers make activation choices according to (3.3), the resulting distribution for the number of active suppliers equals that of T .
The following results shows that when payments are uniform across all potential suppliers, the equilibrium supply size distribution exists and is unique. Lemma 1. Fix p ą 0, ζ P r0, pq, and a P A. Suppose that the payments are ζ-perturbed from p as in (3.7). Then, conditional on A " a, the equilibrium active supply size exists and is unique.
Proof. Throughout, all calculations are based on the conditioning of A " a. Recall that all suppliers know the realization of the global state, a, and the probability that a given supplier will choose to become active is given by (3.3). Denote by X pnq µ a Binomial random variable with n trials and a success probability µ, independent from the rest of the system, and define ψpµ; p, ζq fi E rf B1 ppp`ε i ζqqpµqqs , (3.8)
That is, ψpµ; p, ζq is the probability of a supplier becoming active when offered the payment p i " p`ε i ζ, if they believe that the active supply size is X pnq µ . Note that if the payments offered are uniform across all suppliers, so are the probabilities of the suppliers becoming active, and as a result the actual active supply size will follow a Binomial distribution. In particular, this implies that X pnq µ is an equilibrium active supply size, if and only if it satisfies the following fixed-point equation:
ψpµ; p, ζq " µ.
(3.10)
It suffices to show that (3.10) admits a unique solution in the domain µ P r0, 1s. Because f b p¨q is by construction non-decreasing, it follows that ψpµ; p, ζq is a continuous function and non-increasing in µ: A supplier is more discouraged from becoming active, if they believe there will be more active suppliers in the market eventually. In particular, the left-hand side of (3.10), ψpµ; p, ζq, is a non-negative, continuous and non-increasing function over µ P r0, 1s, which implies that (3.10) admits a unique solution in r0, 1s.
Learning via Local Experimentation
The approach we take in this paper is based on first order optimization: The statistical task is to estimate χ pnq pp, ζ n q at the current value of p as accurately as possible; then, we use this to update the payment using any first-order optimizer that can use noisy gradients. The result below shows that we can in fact accurately estimate gradients of χ pnq pp, ζ n q. As discussed in Section 2 our proposal starts for perturbing individual payments as in (3.7), and then estimating the regression coefficient p ∆ of market participation Z i on the perturbation ζ n ε i , i.e., p ∆ " ζ´1 n ř n i"1 pZ i´s Zqpε i´ε q L ř n i"1 pε i´ε q 2 . Our first result below relates this quantity p ∆ we can estimate via local randomization to a quantity that is more directly relevant to estimating prices, namely the price derivative of χ.
Theorem 2. Suppose that the reward function R in (3.4) is twice continuously differentiable in its first argument. Write s Z " Z{n and s D " D{n. Let
Then, assuming that the perturbations scale as ζ n " ζn´α for some 0 ă a ă 0.5, we have lim sup n Var n " p Γ ı ă 8 and
Our key use of Theorem 2 then involves optimizing for p. Because p Γ is an (asymptotically) unbiased estimate of the gradient of χ at p, we can plug it into any first-order optimization method that allows for noisy gradients. The proposal below is based on adagrad, a form of self-normalizing gradient descent [Duchi et al., 2011] . We need to specify a step size η. Then, at time step k, given a status quo payment p k , we 1. Deploy randomized price perturbations (3.7) to estimate p Γ k as in (4.1), and 2. Perform a gradient update
We can then use standard results to verify convergence of the price sequence p k to the optimal price p˚, such that
In some cases, it may be advantageous to use step sizes that decay faster (e.g., as 1{k as opposed to 1{ ? k) to get price sequences that stabilize more quickly for large values of k.
Proof of Main Results
In this section, we present the proof of our main result, Theorem 2. We begin in Section 5.1 by establishing several regularity results concerning the derivatives of the equilibrium quantities µpp, ζq and qpp, ζq with respect to the perturbation size, ζ and reference price p. Importantly, we show that these bounds hold uniformly over all system sizes n. Using these results, we obtain in Section 5.2 upper bounds on the accuracy of various estimators in our local experimentation scheme. Finally, we combine the estimates in Section 5.3 to establish the convergence of p Γ to dχppq{dp, thus proving Theorem 2.
Sensitivity in Equilibrium
Denote by T pp, ζq the active supply size distribution in equilibrium when the payments are ζ-perturbed from p. Note that since T pp, ζq remains a Binomial distribution, i.e., T pp, ζq d " T µ pnq pp,ζq . Recall that µ a pp, ζq is the expected fraction of active suppliers in equilibrium when the payments are ζ-perturbed from p:
The following lemma provides some crucial structural properties that we will use subsequently to derive guarantees on the estimators for d dp χppq. Lemma 3. Fix p ą 0, a P A and n P N. µ a pp, ζq and q a pp, ζq are twice differentiable functions with respect to ζ, and satisfy:
1.
B
Bζ rµ a pp, ζqs ζ"0 " B Bζ rq a pp, ζqs ζ"0 " 0. 2. Define g ε1 pζq fi pp`ε 1 ζqq a pp, ζq. The second derivatives satisfy:
whereq is defined in (3.9).
3. There exists positive constant C, independent of n but possibly dependent on p, such thatˇˇB 2 B 2 ζ rµ a pp, ζqs ζ"0ˇa ndˇˇB 2 B 2 ζ rq a pp, ζqs ζ"0ˇa re bounded from above by C, uniformly over n P N.
Proof. Some remarks on notation. Throughout the proof, we will assume that the global state a remains fixed, and suppress it from our notation with the understanding that all derivations are conditional on the event that A " a. For a function f pp, ζq, we will use the short-hand B Bζ f pp, 0q to denote B Bζ rf pp, ζqs ζ"0 , and the same convention applies to higher order derivatives.
We begin with a useful proposition showing thatq 1 pµq is uniformly bounded over n. The proof is given in Appendix A.1. Proposition 4. Suppose A " a and µ P p0, 1q, Then, there exists c 0 ą 0, such that
We first prove that B Bζ µpp, 0q " 0. By (3.10), µpp, ζq satisfies where paq follows from the definition of ζ-perturbation ((3.7)) and the independence of tε i u iPN from the rest of the system. Since both σ β andq are bounded, for the first term on the right-hand side of (5.6), it is not difficult to show using the dominated convergence theorem that there exists c ą 0 such that where the last step follows from the fact that B Bζ µpp, 0q " 0. Applying (5.10) and (5.14) to (5.12) and (5.13), we have 17) where the last step follows from the fact that ε 1 P t´1, 1u and hence ε 2 1 " 1. After rearrangement, the above equation yields 
Estimation
Fix a P A and p ą 0. There exists a constant C ą 0 such that, for every ζ and n
We can then take the limit ζ Ñ 0, and verify that there exists C ą 0 such that
Here, we used the fact that B Bζ " q pnq a pp, ζq
by Lemma 3, both f Bi p¨q and q pnq a pp,¨q are twice differentiable with bounded second derivatives (Lemma 3) uniformly over n, and ε i has variance 1.
The main consequence of Lemma 5 is that, for small perturbations ζ, we can consistently recover ∆ pnq a by regressing market participation Z i against the exogenous shocks ε i . The following result provides a formal statement in a large-sample regime where the size of the perturbation ζ n decays as n gets large.
Lemma 6. Fix a P A and p P R`. Suppose we have a sequence of problems indexed by n, and we set a perturbation size ζ n " ζn´α for some 0 ă α ă 0.5. Let as n Ñ 8. Since ζ n Ñ 0 as n Ñ 8, we conclude that as n Ñ 8 the right-hand side of (5.27) converges to E rf B1 ppq 8 a pµqqs uniformly over compact intervals. This proves that µ pnq a ppq converges to µ 8 a ppq as n Ñ 8, the latter being defined as the unique solution to the balance equation:
µ " E rf B1 ppq Next, we note that when n gets large the effect of the payment perturbations on any single potential supplier gets infinitesimally small, and so the covariance of Z i and ε i decays to zero. Standard linear regression theory thus implies that
and furthermore our independent sampling design implies that reading off the relevant variance from the limiting Bernoulli variable Z i , we have lim nÑ8 Var n " Z iˇA " a ‰ " µ 8 a ppqp1μ 8 a ppqq. Finally Er p ∆ˇˇA " as " ζ´1 n Cov n " Z i , ε iˇA " a ‰ , and so the desired claim then follows by noting (5.21).
Finally, we will use p ∆ to construct an estimator for the derivative of the fraction of active suppliers, d dp µ pnq a ppq. Lemma 7. Fix a P A and p P R`, and consider the sequence of problems and ζ n as defined in Lemma 6. Then,
Υ´d dp µ pnq a˙2ˇA " a
Proof. We first note that, for any a P A and p P R`, we have d dp µ a ppq " ∆ and the desired result follows.
Proof of Theorem 2
Conditionally on A " a, we have Z " Binomialpπ, nq with π " µ A ppq. Now recall that, if X is any random variable drawn from an exponential family with natural parameter θ and sufficient statistic HpXq, then for any function f with E θ r|f 1 pXq|s ă 8 we have [Hudson, 1978] d dθ E θ rf pXqs " Cov θ rf pXq, HpXqs .
(5.35)
The binomial distribution is an exponential family with sufficient statistic Z and natural parameter logpπ{p1´πqq, and so we can use the chain rule to check that, in our setting 36) again for any f with an absolutely integrable derivative. We now apply this result to different components of pd{dpqχ pnq A pp, ζ n q. First, by twice differentiability of the reward function R, we can use Taylor approximation to check that
Finally, note that we have thus far used the convention that x 0 :" 0. This assumption simplifies the analysis but leads to a small inconsistency when X µ " 0, since d 0^1 should have been 1, than 0. However, note that as n grows, the probability of X µ " 0 vanishes, it is not difficult to show that the boundedness ofq 1 p¨q should continue to hold.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 8
Proof. Denote by p X and p Y the probability mass functions of X and Y , respectively. where the last inequality follows from the fact that, since Y ĺ X and pf´gqp¨q is monotonically non-increasing, we have that pf´gqpXq ĺ pf´gqpY q.
